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Capita GDP (capita + gdp)
Selected AbstractsLeading Sectors and Leading Regions: Economic Restructuring and Regional Inequality in Hungary since 1990INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007DAVID L. BROWN Abstract This article examines factors accounting for persisting regional inequality in Hungary during the regime change from socialism to a market economy in 1990. We examine the determinants of regional inequality through the lens of leading sector theory which has been used to explain why some ex-socialist countries have done better than others during the transformation. In other words, we ask whether some regions of Hungary are doing better than others for the same reasons that some ex-socialist countries have outperformed their counterparts. We use county level data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to examine whether the quantity and types of foreign direct investment counties have received since 1990 are associated with regional inequality in per capita GDP. We find that foreign capitalists concentrate human-capital-intensive investment in already well performing locations because they have similar supply structures to their home economies. We also contend that no measure of institutional modernization is likely to make lagging regions attractive candidates for human-capital-intensive investments in the near future. Hence, regardless of the national state's efforts to target development to lagging areas, or the effectiveness of local institutions, lagging regions are likely to remain underdeveloped. We recommend that future field-based research be conducted to examine the nexus between FDI, the nation state and localities. Unraveling interrelationships between these three political economy sites will expose the causal forces sustaining regional inequalities during post-socialism. Résumé Cet article analyse les facteurs qui expliquent l'inégalité persistante entre régions hongroises lors du passage du socialisme à une économie de marché en 1990. Nous examinons les déterminants de l'inégalité régionale à travers la théorie du secteur moteur qui a servi à expliquer pourquoi certains ex-pays socialistes ont mieux réussi que d'autres pendant la transition. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à savoir si des régions de Hongrie font mieux que d'autres pour les mêmes raisons que certains ex-pays socialistes ont eu de meilleurs résultats que leurs homologues. Nous utilisons des données départementales provenant du Bureau central hongrois de la statistique afin d'examiner si la quantité et les types d'investissement direct à l'étranger que les départements ont reçu depuis 1990 sont associés à une inégalité régionale en termes de PIB par habitant. Nous établissons ainsi que les capitalistes étrangers concentrent leur investissement à fort capital humain dans des sites qui présentent déjà de bons résultats, les structures d'approvisionnement étant similaires à celles de leur économie nationale. Nous soutenons également que, dans le court terme, aucune mesure de modernisation institutionnelle ne va sans doute transformer les régions en retard en candidates intéressantes pour des investissements à fort capital humain. En conséquence, quels que soient les efforts de l'État national en vue de développer spécifiquement les zones en décalage, ou l'efficacité des institutions locales, les régions en retard resteront sans doute moins développées. Nous conseillons d'entreprendre à l'avenir des études de terrain afin d'analyser le lien entre IDE, État national et régions. Démêler les relations entre ces trois centres de l'économie politique révélera les forces en cause dans la durabilité des inégalités régionales pendant l'après-socialisme. [source] Travel and communication and international differences in GDP per capitaJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2007Edward Anderson Abstract Economic theory predicts that wage and income levels will be higher in those developing countries to which business travel and telecommunication from developed countries is cheaper and easier. Cross-country regression analysis, using data from the World Tourism Organisation and the method of two-stage least squares, supports this prediction. Levels of per capita GDP are higher in those developing countries which receive higher inflows of business travel from other countries, even when controlling for other influences on per capita GDP with which those inflows are correlated. There is also evidence that governments in developing countries can attract higher inflows of business travel from developed countries by investing in travel and communications infrastructure. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Foreign aid and long-run economic growth: empirical evidence for a panel of developing countriesJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2006Georgios Karras Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between foreign aid and growth in per capita GDP using annual data from the 1960 to 1997 period for a sample of 71 aid-receiving developing economies. The results show that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is positive, permanent, statistically significant, and sizable: raising foreign aid by $20 per person of the receiving country results in a permanent increase in the growth rate of real GDP per capita by approximately 0.16,per,cent. Using an alternative foreign-aid measure, a permanent increase in aid by 1,per,cent of the receiving economy's GDP permanently raises the per capita growth rate by 0.14 to 0.26,per,cent. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Correlation between energy usage and the rate of economic developmentOPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 1 2006Salman Saif Ghouri This paper reviews the correlation between per capita GDP and per capita consumption of different sources of energy for OPEC Member Countries, the G-7 and three Asian countries, both with and without natural logarithm. In addition, the paper estimates the ratios for total GDP and total energy consumption of different sources of energy and also estimates GDP energy consumption elasticities. The paper concludes that on a per capita basis most OPEC Countries exhibit negative and weak relationships for all forms of energy, including electricity. For the G-7 and Asian countries, this relationship is positive and strong, with the exception of oil for G-7 countries, where there is a weak correlation. Surprisingly, most OPEC Countries showed a comparatively strong and positive correlation when tested for total GDP in relation to total energy consumption of the respective energy sources. The relationship for the rest of the countries remains unchanged. Population might have distorted the results in OPEC Countries. These results suggest that one should be cautious when drawing conclusions and not ignore the aggregate comparison, as this could otherwise lead to wrong results. For G-7 countries, there has been a significant shift in the pattern of energy consumption in relation to GDP when comparing 1960,73 and 1973,2001. All adjusted downward in the later period. However, the greatest adjustment was associated with petroleum consumption. The general conclusion is that wealth creation in G-7 countries is directly associated with the efficient use of all forms of energy. In contrast, most OPEC Countries exhibit a weaker linkage between energy consumption and economic development on a per capita basis, probably due to inefficient usage of resources or due to disproportionate distribution of wealth and thus energy usage. [source] The Millennium Survey: How Economists View the U.S. Economy in the 21st CenturyAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2000Frederick L. Pryor This essay presents the results of a survey of AEA members on how they expect the U.S. economy to evolve in the next 50 years. More specifically, respondents were asked about changes in a variety of macroeconomic variables and whether such changes would lead to major changes in the economic system or important economic institutions. For the next quarter century, for instance, the respondents foresee the greatest deviation from current trends occurring with regard to growth of per capita GDP, volatility of the financial system, and globalization. They also predict that changes in the economic system will most likely come about from the impact of increasing globalization, increasing inequality of income, and increasing financial instability. [source] Exploratory spatial data analysis of the distribution of regional per capita GDP in Europe, 1980,1995PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2003Julie Le Gallo European Union; exploratory spatial data analysis; regional disparities; spatial autocorrelation; spatial heterogeneity Abstract. The aim of this paper is to study the space-time dynamics of European regional per capital GDP. A sample of 138 European regions over the 1980,1995 period provides clear evidence of global and local spatial autocorrelation as well as spatial heterogeneity in the distribution of regional per capita GDP. The detection of spatial clusters of high and low per capita GDP throughout the period is an indication of the persistence of spatial disparities among European regions. The dynamism of European regions is investigated by exploring the spatial pattern of regional growth. Implications for applied econometric work on the convergence of European regions are then suggested. [source] Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Evidence from Spanish RegionsPUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 4 2009DAVID CANTARERO The degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is similar to main federal countries and greater than unitary ones. The demand of public sector decentralization is based on a supposed efficiency gains that is far from being obvious. Using a data set for the Spanish regions, we reject the null hypothesis of a significant relationship between growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure distribution among fiscal administrations. Nonetheless, we find empirical support for a relationship between revenue decentralization, far less advanced than the expenditure one, and growth. In both cases we do reject the null hypothesis of a nonlinear linkage between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita GDP. [source] Foreign debt and economic growthTHE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2001Shuanglin Lin This paper empirically examines the relationship between government foreign debt and the growth rate of per capita GDP based on a total sample of 77 countries, as well as sub-samples of various regions. Cross-sectional estimates of the coefficient of foreign debt based on the total sample have a negative sign, but are not always statistically significant. Available data from African countries indicate that foreign debt and the growth rate of per capita GDP were negatively related at a high level of significance. For industrialized and Latin American sub-samples, this relationship is negative but statistically insignificant. The sub-sample Asian and other developing countries show a positive but insignificant relationship. JEL classification: F34, H6, O23. [source] Inequality and Determinants of Earnings in Malaysia, 1984,1997,ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 2 2006Branko Milanovic J21; J31; J7; O12 Using three large nationally-representative Malaysian Household Income Surveys from 1984, 1989 and 1997, the present paper examines inequality and determinants of earnings. During the period 1984,1997, Malaysia's real per capita GDP increased by approximately 70percent, the participation rates for both men and women went up among all age groups, and the average number of years of schooling increased by 1.2years. There was a significant relative wage improvement among the bottom deciles. The rate of return to an additional year of schooling remained high (at 10percent), despite the huge increase in the supply of the highly educated. The stable overall rate, however, masks an increased rate of return on women's education, and a decreased rate for men. Wage discrimination against women amounts to 16,20percent, and the bias has increased in 1997. The pro-Chinese earning ethnic bias is estimated at 31percent. [source] Canadian city housing prices and urban market segmentationCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Jason Allen Abstract This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of Canadian city housing prices. We examine the long-run relationship between city house prices in Canada from 1985 to 2005 as well as idiosyncratic relations between city prices and city-specific variables. The results suggest that city house prices are only weakly correlated in the long run and that there is a disconnect between house prices and interest rates. City-specific variables such as union wage levels and the issuance of building permits tend to be positively related to existing city house prices. Surprisingly, there is mixed evidence with respect to standard measures of economic activity such as per capita GDP and interest rates. Ce mémoire présente une analyse empirique détaillée des prix des maisons dans les villes canadiennes. On examine cette relation à long terme de 1985 à 2005 ainsi que les rapports idiosyncratiques entre ces prix et certaines variables caractéristiques de certaines villes. Les résultats montrent que les prix des maisons urbaines sont faiblement co-reliées à long terme et qu'il existe une déconnexion entre le prix des maisosn et les taux d'intérêt. Certaines variables spécifiques à certaines villes comme les niveaux de salaires des syndiqués ou l'émission de permis de construction tendent àêtre positivement reliées aux prix des maisons existantes. Surprenamment, les résultats sont mixtes pour ce qui est des mesures d'activitééconomique comme le PIB per capita ou les taux d'intérêt. [source] Innis Lecture: Canadian policies for broad-based prosperityCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008Daniel Trefler According to this myth there is only one path to prosperity, and if we are to successfully travel this path, first charted by Americans, then we must abandon our most disadvantaged. We must sacrifice our core Canadian values of community and caring on the altar of competitiveness. Yet the facts of the last three decades scream out against this myth. Over that time Canada's per capita GDP fell by almost 20% relative to the United States. And this sacrifice of prosperity did not make us a more caring society. Instead, it depleted our fiscal resources by a staggering $68 billion per year and left us without the wherewithal to take care of our most disadvantaged. In this paper I debunk the myth that there is a trade-off between a prosperous society and a caring society. In place of the myth I offer up a cohesive picture of what ails Canada and how we can cure it. Les architectes de la politique au Canada opèrent dans le brouillard d'un mythe, un mythe qui a été tellement répété qu'on le prend souvent à tort pour une vérité. Selon ce mythe, il n'y a qu'une voie vers la prospérité, et si l'on veut voyager avec succès sur cette voie, cartographiée d'abord par les Américains, on doit abandonner nos plus désavantagés à leur sort. On doit sacrifier nos valeurs de base de communauté et de compassion sur l'autel de la compétitivité. Or les expériences des dernières décennies s'inscrivent en faux contre ce mythe. Au cours de cette période, le PIB per capita au Canada a chuté de 20% par rapport à celui des Etats-Unis. Et ce sacrifice de prospérité n'a pas accru le niveau de compassion. Au contraire, nos ressources fiscales ont chuté de $68 milliards par année, et nous ont laissé moins capables de nous occuper des plus désavantagés. Dans ce texte, l'auteur s'attaque au mythe qu'il faut faire un choix entre une société de prospérité ou une société de compassion. Pour remplacer ce mythe, il met en place un diagnostic cohérent des maux qui affligent le Canada et des moyens pour les guérir. [source] Distinguishing between trend-break models: method and empirical evidenceTHE ECONOMETRICS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2001Chih-Chiang Hsu We demonstrate that in time trend models, the likelihood-based tests of partial parameter stability have size distortions and cannot be applied to detect the changing parameter. A two-step procedure is then proposed to distinguish between different trend-break models. This procedure involves consistent estimation of break dates and properly-sized tests for changing coefficient. In the empirical study of the Nelson-Plosser data set, we find that the estimated change points and trend-break specifications resulting from the proposed procedure are quite different from those of Perron (1989, 1997), Chu and White (1992), and Zivot and Andrews (1992). In another application, our procedure provides formal support for the conclusion of Ben-David and Papell (1995) that real per capita GDPs of most OECD countries exhibit a slope change in trend. [source] | |||||||||||||