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Call Auction (call + auction)
Selected AbstractsSWITCHING TO A TEMPORARY CALL AUCTION IN TIMES OF HIGH UNCERTAINTYTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2010David Abad Abstract We evaluate a stock-specific circuit breaker implemented in several European stock exchanges, which consists of a short-lived call auction triggered by intraday stock-specific price limits. It differs from U.S. trading halts in that it is short-lived and nondiscretionary, and a trading mechanism (continuous or discrete) is always going. It differs from daily price limits in that trade prices are not restricted once the limit is hit. Intraday price ranges are smaller and adjusted to the recent volatility, so that limit hits are more frequent. We contribute to the debate about circuit breakers by enlarging the span of these mechanisms studied. [source] On the Magnet Effect of Price LimitsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 5 2007David Abad G1; G14; D44 Abstract The ,magnet' or ,gravitational' effect hypothesis asserts that, when trading halts are rule-based, investors concerned with a likely impediment to trade advance trades in time. This behaviour actually pushes prices further towards the limit. Empirical studies about the magnet effect are scarce, most likely because of the unavailability of data on rule-based halts. In this paper, we use a large database from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), which combines intraday stock specific price limits and short-lived rule-based call auctions to stabilise prices, to test this hypothesis. The SSE is particularly well suited to test the magnet effect hypothesis since trading halts are price-triggered and, therefore, predictable to some extent. Still, the SSE microstructure presents two particularities: (i) a limit-hit triggers an automatic switch to an alternative trading mechanism, a call auction, rather than a pure halt; (ii) the trading halt only lasts 5 minutes. We find that, even when prices are within a very short distance to the price limits, the probability of observing a limit-hit is unexpectedly low. Additionally, prices either initiate reversion (non limit-hit days) or slow down gradually (limit-hit days) as they come near the intraday limits. Finally, the most aggressive traders progressively become more patient as prices approach the limits. Therefore, both the price patterns and the trading behaviour reported near the limits do not agree with the price limits acting as magnetic fields. Consequently, we conclude that the switching mechanism implemented in the SSE does not induce traders to advance their trading programs in time. [source] A Parimutuel Market Microstructure for Contingent ClaimsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2005Jeffrey Lange G10; G13; G14 Abstract Parimutuel principles are widely used as an alternative to fixed odds gambling in which a bookmaker acts as a dealer by quoting fixed rates of return on specified wagers. A parimutuel game is conducted as a call auction in which odds are allowed to fluctuate during the betting period until the betting period is closed or the auction ,called'. The prices or odds of wagers are set based upon the relative amounts wagered on each risky outcome. In financial microstructure terms, trading under parimutuel principles is characterised by (1) call auction, non-continuous trading; (2) riskless funding of claim payouts using the amounts paid for all of the claims during the auction; (3) special equilibrium pricing conditions requiring the relative prices of contingent claims equal the relative aggregate amounts wagered on such claims; (4) endogenous determination of unique state prices; and (5) higher efficiency. Recently, a number of large investment banks have adopted a parimutuel mechanism for offering contingent claims on various economic indices, such as the US Nonfarm payroll report and Eurozone Harmonised inflation. Our paper shows how the market microstructure incorporating parimutuel principles for contingent claims which allows for notional transactions, limit orders, and bundling of claims across states is constructed. We prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium for such a market and suggest an algorithm for computing the equilibrium. We also suggest that for a broad class of contingent claims, that the parimutuel microstructure recently deployed offers many advantages over the dominant dealer and exchange continuous time mechanisms. [source] Closing call auctions and liquidityACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2005Michael Aitken G14; G15 Abstract The present paper examines the impact of closing call auctions on liquidity. It exploits the natural experiment offered by the introduction of a closing call auction on the Australian Stock Exchange on 10 February 1997. The introduction of the closing call auction is associated with a reduction in trading volume at the close of continuous trading. However, bid-ask spreads during continuous trading are largely unaffected by the introduction of the closing call auction. Therefore, closing call auctions consolidate liquidity at a single point in time without having any adverse effect on the cost of trading. [source] SWITCHING TO A TEMPORARY CALL AUCTION IN TIMES OF HIGH UNCERTAINTYTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2010David Abad Abstract We evaluate a stock-specific circuit breaker implemented in several European stock exchanges, which consists of a short-lived call auction triggered by intraday stock-specific price limits. It differs from U.S. trading halts in that it is short-lived and nondiscretionary, and a trading mechanism (continuous or discrete) is always going. It differs from daily price limits in that trade prices are not restricted once the limit is hit. Intraday price ranges are smaller and adjusted to the recent volatility, so that limit hits are more frequent. We contribute to the debate about circuit breakers by enlarging the span of these mechanisms studied. [source] | ||||||||||