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Cabinet Government (cabinet + government)
Selected AbstractsCabinet Government: An Elusive Ideal?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 4 2003Patrick Weller This article will explore the proposition that cabinet government is dead by examining the different ways in which cabinet government is conceptualized and by suggesting that the lack of precision in the debates has undermined much of the criticism. It will seek to draw the strands of research together in a way that can emphasize how cabinet government has evolved while remaining at the core of government. The article will draw evidence from three countries, Australia, Canada and Britain, in each of which, despite the common heritage, cabinet has evolved in different ways. [source] Cabinet Government in the Twentieth CenturyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 5 2004Christopher Foster This paper examines the main features of the cabinet system as it had emerged during the twentieth century, and which Jennings did so much to crystallize in his pioneering study on Cabinet Government. It then assesses the main changes that have occurred over successive administrations since the late 1970s, and concludes that even if cabinet government seemed to return in 1990 and 2003, it was without the cabinet system that had underpinned and made it effective in the past. [source] Cabinet Government: An Elusive Ideal?PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 4 2003Patrick Weller This article will explore the proposition that cabinet government is dead by examining the different ways in which cabinet government is conceptualized and by suggesting that the lack of precision in the debates has undermined much of the criticism. It will seek to draw the strands of research together in a way that can emphasize how cabinet government has evolved while remaining at the core of government. The article will draw evidence from three countries, Australia, Canada and Britain, in each of which, despite the common heritage, cabinet has evolved in different ways. [source] The Government Agenda in Parliamentary DemocraciesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2004Lanny W. Martin Lawmaking is a challenge for coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent policy goals. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government exacerbates the problem by providing parties the means to undermine the coalition bargain in the pursuit of their own policy interests. In this article, I explore whether arrangements that allow partners to police one another induce compromise on one of the most important decisions taken by a government,the organization of the policy agenda. In an analysis of original data on the timing and policy content of over 800 government bills from four European democracies, I show that coalition governments pursue a largely "accommodative" agenda. Policy initiatives dealing with issues that are more attractive to all partners in the coalition are likely to be given priority on the agenda, while those dealing with relatively unattractive issues are likely to be postponed. [source] Cabinet Government in the Twentieth CenturyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 5 2004Christopher Foster This paper examines the main features of the cabinet system as it had emerged during the twentieth century, and which Jennings did so much to crystallize in his pioneering study on Cabinet Government. It then assesses the main changes that have occurred over successive administrations since the late 1970s, and concludes that even if cabinet government seemed to return in 1990 and 2003, it was without the cabinet system that had underpinned and made it effective in the past. [source] Do Ministers Do What They Say?POLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2002Collegial, Hierarchical Governments, Ministerial Unreliability This paper is concerned with the extent to which individual members of governments reliably implement the decisions of the governments to which they belong, a matter which is rarely discussed, if ever, and yet can be critical for the operation of national executives. After a general presentation of the problem, the paper examines the reasons why members of collegial governments are more likely to be reliable than members of hierarchical governments. As ,cabinet' governments tend to be more collegial while ,presidential' governments tend to be more hierarchical, unreliability seems also more likely to take place in presidential governments, to the extent that these are indeed hierarchical. Progress in this area has been hampered so far by the absence of a tight operational definition of collegial and hierarchical governments: such a definition is presented here, opening the way for the empirical testing of the impact which the distinction may have on the reliability of members of governments. [source] | ||||||||||