|
| ||
|
|
||
Budget Cycles (budget + cycle)
Selected AbstractsSignaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go?JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2005JORGE MIGUEL STREB A key assumption in the literature on political cycles with rational voters and opportunistic politicians is that opportunism is common knowledge. In this framework, political cycles have been interpreted as a signal of competency. However, if opportunism is not common knowledge, cycles may no longer indicate competency, but rather opportunism. This is because highly opportunistic incumbents are willing to go farther to be reelected. Since political cycles require discretionality to reallocate budget items, a decrease of discretionality curbs cycles. It may also make elections more effective at selecting competent incumbents. [source] China's Local Political Budget CyclesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2009Gang Guo This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more performance-based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created an incentive structure for local leaders to increase government spending at strategically important time points during their tenure to enhance the prospect of official promotion. Such expenditures help local leaders to impress their superiors with economic and political achievements, especially those visible and quantifiable large-scale development projects. At the same time, economic and fiscal decentralization increased the capacity of local leaders to influence government budget expenditures as the need rises. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between a leader's time in office and increased spending was tested using a comprehensive data set of all Chinese counties from 1997 through 2002. The panel data analysis shows that growth in local government spending per capita is the fastest during a leader's third and fourth years in office. [source] Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD CountriesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2006James E. Alt We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. While some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies, in contrast we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies. Using a sample of 19 OECD countries in the 1990s, we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries. Furthermore, we find, in accordance with recent theory, that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries. [source] A Framework for Understanding State Balanced Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Operational DefinitionPUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 3 2006YILIN HOU Studies of state fiscal and budgetary policies often use balanced budget requirements (BBRs) as explanatory variables. While current measures laid the crucial groundwork for a basic understanding of state BBRs, their lack of comprehensiveness threatens the validity of empirical work. Based on comprehensive legal research, this article offers a framework for analyzing state requirements: each state's BBRs form a coherent system for achieving budget balance through budget cycles; a fully developed BBR system offers a three-line construct against imbalance; and the more complete, developed, and explicit a BBR system is, the more stringent it will be in achieving budgetary balance. [source] China's Local Political Budget CyclesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2009Gang Guo This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more performance-based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created an incentive structure for local leaders to increase government spending at strategically important time points during their tenure to enhance the prospect of official promotion. Such expenditures help local leaders to impress their superiors with economic and political achievements, especially those visible and quantifiable large-scale development projects. At the same time, economic and fiscal decentralization increased the capacity of local leaders to influence government budget expenditures as the need rises. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between a leader's time in office and increased spending was tested using a comprehensive data set of all Chinese counties from 1997 through 2002. The panel data analysis shows that growth in local government spending per capita is the fastest during a leader's third and fourth years in office. [source] | ||||||||||