Bond Ratings (bond + rating)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Distribution within Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting


Selected Abstracts


Split Bond Ratings and Information Opacity Premiums

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010
Miles Livingston
This paper examines the relationship between split bond ratings and bond yields at the notch level for newly issued corporate bonds. We find that split rated bonds average a 7-basis-point yield premium over nonsplit rated bonds of similar credit risk. The yield premium increases from 5 basis points for one-notch splits to 15 (20) basis points for two-notch (three-notch) splits. These findings indicate that investors demand higher yields for split rated bonds to compensate for the information opacity of such bonds. In addition, the yield premium for split rated bonds is higher during economic recessions, indicating investors are more risk averse during economic downturns. Consequently, split ratings impose higher borrowing costs for firms, especially during economic downturns. [source]


Asset Opaqueness and Split Bond Ratings

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2007
Miles Livingston Professor of Finance
We examine the relation between asset opaqueness and split ratings. We find that firms with asset opaqueness problems are more likely to receive split bond ratings from Moody s and S&P rating agencies. Our results suggest that there is a causal link between asset opaqueness and split ratings. [source]


The Information Value of Bond Ratings

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2000
Doron Kliger
We test whether bond ratings contain pricing-relevant information by examining security price reactions to Moody's refinement of its rating system, which was not accompanied by any fundamental change in issuers' risks, was not preceded by any announcement, and was carried simultaneously for all bonds. We find that rating information does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings. We also find that when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings, the volatilities implied by prices of options on the fine-rated issuers' shares decline (rise). [source]


Are Fundamentals Priced in the Bond Market?,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003
Inder K. Khurana
Abstract To date, the discussion of the Lev and Thiagarajan 1993 fundamentals in the prior literature has been exclusively in the context of the stock market. Our study is the first to examine the value-relevance of these fundamentals for default risk. By focusing on the market for new bond issues, we examine the value-relevance of the fundamental score using expected rather than realized returns. Also, by focusing on the bond market we provide a different perspective than that brought by prior studies relying solely on stock prices. We find the fundamentals to be priced in the market for new bond issues as indicators of expected future earnings and to be value-relevant in enabling the market to discern differences in bond credit quality over and above the published bond ratings. [source]


Split Bond Ratings and Information Opacity Premiums

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2010
Miles Livingston
This paper examines the relationship between split bond ratings and bond yields at the notch level for newly issued corporate bonds. We find that split rated bonds average a 7-basis-point yield premium over nonsplit rated bonds of similar credit risk. The yield premium increases from 5 basis points for one-notch splits to 15 (20) basis points for two-notch (three-notch) splits. These findings indicate that investors demand higher yields for split rated bonds to compensate for the information opacity of such bonds. In addition, the yield premium for split rated bonds is higher during economic recessions, indicating investors are more risk averse during economic downturns. Consequently, split ratings impose higher borrowing costs for firms, especially during economic downturns. [source]


Asset Opaqueness and Split Bond Ratings

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2007
Miles Livingston Professor of Finance
We examine the relation between asset opaqueness and split ratings. We find that firms with asset opaqueness problems are more likely to receive split bond ratings from Moody s and S&P rating agencies. Our results suggest that there is a causal link between asset opaqueness and split ratings. [source]


Enhancing Security Value by Ownership Restrictions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2005
Amar Gande
We present new evidence from a natural experiment to show circumstances in which ownership restrictions can enhance value. Our evidence is based on multiple restricted bond issues by an emerging market issuer at 150 basis points lower than comparable bonds, resulting in a billion dollars saving. This is intriguing: how can an emerging market issuer with junk bond ratings obtain such low yields? We argue ownership restrictions enhance value since they enable an issuer to precommit to renegotiate efficiently with a favored clientele in the potential default states, thereby circumventing deadweight costs of prolonged negotiations, particularly when the restricted clientele also values the underlying collateral higher than other investors. Ownership restrictions can also result in a transfer of value from holders of unrestricted bonds to holders of restricted bonds because of implicit seniority of the latter. We empirically test and find support for both value enhancement and value transfer and show robustness to several alternative explanations. Our evidence suggests that firms can benefit from designing securities with ownership restrictions, by offering new securities exclusively to investors who value them the most. [source]


A Reexamination of the Tradeoff between the Future Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008
ALLAN EBERHART
ABSTRACT Many previous studies document a positive relation between research and development (R&D) and equity value. Though R&D can increase equity value by increasing firm value, it can also increase equity value at the expense of bondholder wealth through an increase in firm risk because equity is analogous to a call option on the underlying firm value. Shi [2003] tests this hypothesis by examining the relation between a firm's R&D intensity and its bond ratings and risk premiums at issuance. His results show that the net effect of R&D is negative for bondholders. We reexamine Shi's [2003] findings and in so doing make three contributions to the literature. First, we find that Shi's [2003] results are sensitive to the method of measuring R&D intensity. When we use what we argue is a better measure of R&D intensity, we find that the net effect of R&D is positive for bondholders. Second, when we use tests that Shi [2003] recognizes are even better than the ones that he uses, we find even stronger evidence of the positive effect of R&D on bondholders. Third, we examine cross-sectional differences in the effect of R&D on debtholders. Consistent with our main finding, we document a negative relation between R&D increases and default risk. The default risk reduction is also more pronounced for firms with higher initial default scores (where the debtholders have more to gain from an R&D increase) and for firms with more bank debt (where the debtholders have greater covenant protection from the possible detriments associated with R&D increases). [source]


Moody's and S&P Ratings: Are They Equivalent?

JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 7 2010
Conservative Ratings, Split Rated Bond Yields
bond ratings; bond yields; reputation capital We examine the relative impact of Moody's and S&P ratings on bond yields and find that at issuance, yields on split rated bonds with superior Moody's ratings are about 8 basis points lower than yields on split rated bonds with superior S&P ratings. This suggests that investors differentiate between the two ratings and assign more weight to the ratings from Moody's, the more conservative rating agency. Moody's becomes more conservative after 1998 and the impact of a superior Moody's rating becomes stronger. Furthermore, the differential impact of the two ratings is more pronounced for the more opaque Rule 144A issues. [source]


The Information Value of Bond Ratings

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2000
Doron Kliger
We test whether bond ratings contain pricing-relevant information by examining security price reactions to Moody's refinement of its rating system, which was not accompanied by any fundamental change in issuers' risks, was not preceded by any announcement, and was carried simultaneously for all bonds. We find that rating information does not affect firm value, but that debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings. We also find that when Moody's announces better- (worse-) than-expected ratings, the volatilities implied by prices of options on the fine-rated issuers' shares decline (rise). [source]


THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006
Ha-Chin Yi
Abstract We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross-sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market. [source]