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Bid Premiums (bid + premium)
Selected AbstractsDeal Size, Bid Premium, and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial MotivationsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Atul Gupta G14; G21; G34 Abstract Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value-enhancing versus value-reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids. [source] The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder WealthAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Peter M. Clarkson We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non-executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively. [source] Deal Size, Bid Premium, and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial MotivationsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Atul Gupta G14; G21; G34 Abstract Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value-enhancing versus value-reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids. [source] The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder WealthAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Peter M. Clarkson We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non-executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively. [source] | ||||||||||